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I.

Essential Facts About Groundwater and Groundwater
Law.
A.

About groundwater resources -- aquifers and
their contents.
1.

Groundwater directly supplies only
about one-fifth of the water used in
the United States, but it is far more
important than that percentage would
suggest.
a.

Most of the water in watercourses
has reached them from percolating
groundwater. Pumping from an
aquifer or diverting from a river
are usually alternative means of
using the same water supply.

b.

Water in streams fluctuates
seasonally and cyclically, and
often unpredictably. Water stored
in an aquifer (naturally or artificially) is available at the
touch of the button that starts
the pump. For this reason underground storage is particularly
useful at times when the surface
supply is unavailable. Conjunctive operation of surface and
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underground supplies makes for
efficiency in achieving maximum
satisfaction of water demand.

C.

Groundwater storage is more efficient than storage in surface
reservoirs because water does not
evaporate from subsurface aquifers; groundwater storage does not
inundate and destroy valuable
land; aquifers serve to treat
stored water, filtering both
pathogens and contaminants; they
also serve to transmit water without ditches, pipes, or canals.

2.

Most water supplies available for use
in the United States -- surface, underground, or both -- are accessible to
pumping or diversion in more than one
state.

B.

About groundwater law.
1.

The multiplicity of labelled doctrines
of groundwater law in various states
share a common purpose: to allocate
among potentially competing users a
scarce resource which is adequate for
only some of the demands: "absolute
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ownership" or the rule of unlimited
capture by the overlying owner;
"reasonable use"; "correlative rights";
"prior appropriation." All begin no
earlier than the English decision in
Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324,
152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843). That case
was based on the since discarded factual premise that the ways of groundwater are unknown and unknowable.
2.

"Priority of appropriation" has been
the preferred doctrine to or toward
which arid states in the west have
moved since New Mexico and Oregon, in
1927, adopted legislative systems for
its administration. (See Yeo v.
Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 Pac. 970
(1929). For a careful account of the
early development, see Kirkwood,
Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1948).)
a.

When "priority of appropriation"
is transferred from water running
in a stream to water stored and
"percolating" through an aquifer,
a number of new problems arise:
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(1) Is the water available for
appropriation limited to 'safe
yield'? (2) Is 'mining' beyond
safe yield to be permitted, and if
so, what are the limits? (3) What
increases in pump lifts are permissible, and how are costs of
increases to be determined and
shared? (4) By what means are
necessary adjustments to be made
when previous definitions or calculations of 'safe yield' require
revision? (5) What governments
are empowered or required to prevent physical damages to groundwater resources, by excavating,
mining, blasting, garbage disposal, fertilizers, and disposition of toxic chemical wastes?
How are costs of conservation to
be allocated to (a) beneficiaries;
(b) taxpayers of state or nation?
b.

Contrast priority of appropriation
of groundwater and water from a
surface stream. Administration of
a priority system served by a
creek or river requires only
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determining the quantity of each
diverter's right and ministerial
action of turning off the diversions in inverse chronological
order of initiation as water grows
shorter. Pollution is preventable
by prohibitions, but if the
stream's contents are flushed at
least once per season, permanent
damage is most unlikely. Even
fish kills can be replaced in
nearly every instance.
c.

The ultimate problem in allocating
groundwater is shared by uses of
other stored water from large
surface reservoirs like Lake Mead
on the Colorado River. In any
year in which water can be held
over, junior users argue that any
present shortage not only can but
should be met from storage, rather
than holding water in storage to
evaporate, and the unevaporated
residue to be used by senior users
if the pre-drought rains do not
return. Most historic errors from
miscalculating future water supply
-5-

have been in the direction of
disastrous over-optimism.
d.

Surface water precedents dealing
with surface reservoirs are not
usually helpful because:
(1) Most surface waters are
constructed to serve a single
project. If not, ad hoc contracts
or legislation usually settle
priority issues in advance.
(2) The hydrologic uncertainties about quantities of water
in storage are of a different
order of magnitude for surface and
underground storage. Water in a
surface reservoir can be calculated by resort to gauged depth of
water and an area capacity curve.
The water contents of an aquifer
are determinable from a variety of
physical data, but data are
usually insufficient until that
aquifer is in deep trouble.
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II. Interstate water Law.
A.

Facts about states.
1.

Boundaries of the 50 United States are
constitutionally fixed and substantially immovable. (U.S. Const. art.
IV, S 3, cl. 1.)

2.

A state's jurisdiction to make and
enforce law is limited by its
territorial limits.

B.

Each state's power to create, regulate,
transfer, and terminate water rights is
limited to its equitable share of the
interstate water resource to which two or
more states have access. (Hinderlider

v.-1

La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92 (1938).)
C.

The methods of establishing a state's
equitable share are, in order of first
historic recognition:
1.

A suit for equitable apportionment in
the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.

2.

An interstate compact with the consent
of Congress under U.S. Const., art. 1,
S 10.

3.

A "congressional apportionment" by or
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under authority of an Act of Congress.
(Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963); 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (decree).)

D.

All such methods of establishing a state's
equitable share may, within reasonable
limits at least, operate retroactively to
alter or divest what within one state would
be a vested property right not subject to
being taken without the "just compensation"
required by the final clause of the
fourteenth amendment.

III. Sporhase V. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 Sup.
Ct. 3456 (1982).
A.

Sporhase was decided July 2, 1982, on the
last crowded day of the Court's 1981-82
term. It was not an interstate case, but a
Nebraska case presented by the owners of
land in Nebraska appealing from a decision
refusing them a permit to irrigate their
adjoining land in Colorado from their
Nebraska well. The United States Supreme
Court held that the part of a Nebraska
statute denying such a permit for water use
in a state which denies reciprocity to
Nebraska is unconstitutional. The Court
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remanded to Nebraska to determine whether
the unconstitutional provision is severable
from the remainder of the statute. The
Nebraska Supreme Court has since decided
that it is indeed severable.
The important holding of Sporhase in
doctrinal terms is clear: the dormant or
negative commerce clause (i.e., the commerce
clause of its own force where Congress has
not exercised its "power to regulate
commerce among the several states") does
invalidate some state legislation with
respect to groundwater and/or groundwater
rights. That statement, however, is only
the introduction to the critical issues
which will require answers.
B.

The Court's formulation of issues. The
issues formulated by Justice Stevens for a
7-justice majority are:
1W]hether ground water is an
"(1)
article of commerce and therefore
subject to congressional legislation;
"(2)
[W]hether restriction on the
interstate transportation of ground
water imposes an impermissible burden
on commerce;
"(3)
[W]hether Congress has granted
the States permission to engage in
ground water regulation that otherwise
would be impossible." (Id. at 3458.)
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1.

The Court's answers, in three roman
numbered sections of its opinion,
follow in the same order: (1) yes;
(2) yes; (3) no. The astonishing part
of the opinion is that the Court found
it necessary to address the first and
third questions. Both "issues" are
beyond range of reasonable argument.
However, the care taken to elucidate
the obvious has itself provoked consternation and fear. There is as a
result a distinct danger that the
judicial excursions may produce a
flurry of misdirected legislation.

2.

Non-issues:
a.

The Court's "issue (1)". Who
could doubt that "water" is a
commodity, if the question relates
to extracted water from wells or
springs, bottled or barrelled as a
commodity, and offered for sale,
with or without additives found in
beverages whether soft, brewed, or
distilled. It is clear, however,
that Nebraska's statute did not
relate to "water" as a commodity,
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but to "water rights."
It is clear that Congress
within reasonable limits can
regulate water rights. Water
rights affect commerce. Congress
can regulate whatever interstate
activities affect interstate commerce, including Roscoe Filburn's
production of a few excess acres
of wheat fed entirely to his own
animals on his own farm. (Wickard

V.

Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).)
Whether the subject matter of

regulation is a commodity has
never been the touchstone of regulation since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). The
federal statute providing for
enrolling vessels in the coasting
trade preempted state law granting
a monopoly to navigation on interstate water although the ferryboats did not carry a "commodity."
Congress has regulated interstate
transportation of women for
immoral purposes in the Mann Act,
without denominating either women

or the purposes of transportation
a "commodity." (Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470
(1917); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (statute barring
interstate migration of indigents
unconstitutional.)
The Nebraska Supreme Court
said that "water" is not a commodity, but it seems most improbable
that the state court intended to
challenge by an irrelevant dictum
a power of Congress which Congress
had not attempted to exercise.
(State ex rel. Douglas V.
Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d
614 (Neb. 1981).)
The "commodity" language was
sometimes used by the Supreme
Court in an earlier era to
describe activities which states
can regulate, although an aspect
of commerce, until Congress provides to the contrary. (E.g.,
Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 430
(1939) (dead horses not "articles
of interstate commerce" for the
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purpose of invalidating Indiana's
Animal Disposal Act, although it
is clear the Supreme Court did not
intend to put dead horses gratuitously outside power of Congress
if Congress should legislate on
subject).)
b.

The Court's "issue (3)". Has Congress granted "permission" to the
States to regulate groundwater?
No "permission" statute was
cited. It would be extraordinary
if such a statute could be found.
Reason: The Court's opinions from
Willson v. Black-bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 244 (1829),
through Hudson County Water
Company v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349
(1908), have been clear that no
such congressional permission is
needed.
Indeed, Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851), adopted the view that
"permission" by Congress would be
an unconstitutional delegation if
it related to future state legis-
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lation. That view was overturned
in United States v. Sharpneck, 355
U.S. 286 (1958).

It is now clear

that Congress can relinquish to
states regulation of interstate
commerce. (Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946);
Western S.L.I. Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).

IV. The Narrow Holding of Sporhase.
A.

The narrow holding of Sporhase can be stated
best in the terms used by the Court. The
following text of Neb. Rev. Stat.
46.613.01 is reproduced with the provision
held unconstitutional stricken, numbers are
inserted preceding each of the three
conditions of the statute which remain.
The three conditions survived "facial
examination" (102 Sup. Ct. at 3465) and are
not unconstitutional until and unless
Nebraska hereafter makes an egregious
mistake:
"Any person, firm, city, village,
municipal corporation or any other
entity intending to withdraw ground
water from any well or pit located in
the State of Nebraska and transport it
for use in an adjoining state shall
apply to the Department of Water
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Resources for a permit to do so. If
the Director of water Resources finds
that
(1) the withdrawal of the ground
water requested is reasonable,
(2) is not contrary to the
conservation and use of ground
water,
(3) and is not otherwise
detrimental to the public
welfare,
he shall grant the permit if-the-state
4a-wh4eh-the-mate.s-4s-te-be-ased-gcaats
ee4preea4-c4ghte-4e-w4thdcaw-andtafispeEt-ceirnd- watec- flew- that- state
feE-ase-4a-the-6tate-ef-Nebcaska."
[Parenthetical numbers and strike out
added.]
B.

The elimination of the stricken words of
that statute does not necessarily impair its
vitality to serve the purpose Nebraska
originally pursued. Indeed, their elimination may improve its vitality by persuading
the Director and reviewing courts to state
the reasons for denial of a permit rather
than to repeat the statutory words of a
legislative ipse dixit. A final footnote to
Justice Rehnquist's dissent (joined by
Justice O'Connor) understates the case:
". . . I . . . see nothing in the
Court's opinion that would preclude the
Nebraska Department of Water Resources
from denying appellants a permit
because of remaining conditions in the
statute." (102 Sup. Ct. at 3469 n.3.)
There is, I would say, nothing in the
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Court's opinion to be seen.
C.

Further limitations in the Court's opinion
make clear that on a record with different
facts even the unconstitutional language
might be operative:
"If it could be shown that the State as
a whole suffers a water shortage, that
the intrastate transportation of water
from areas of abundance to areas of
shortage is feasible regardless of
distance, and that the importation of
water from adjoining States would
roughly compensate for any exportation
to those States, then the conservation
and preservation purpose might be
credibly advanced for the reciprocity
provision." (102 Sup. Ct. at 3465.)
[The set of facts which that
sentence describes is not easy to
visualize. However, it is clear
that the clause stricken would not
have been stricken if appropriate
facts -- of which those just
described are only an example -were in the record.]
The Court went on to say:
"A demonstrably arid state conceivably
might be able to marshall evidence to
establish a close means-end relationship between even a total ban on the
exportation of water and a purpose to
conserve and preserve water." (Id.)

-16-
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V.

The Facts Missing From The sporhase Record.
A.

The facts were supplied in an amicus brief
signed by the Attorneys General of Colorado
and of several western states:
In 1977 Colorado denied the Sporhase
farm owners a permit to drill a well in
Colorado. Reason: no water was available
to appropriate. The applicants did not
appeal.
Of course, the Court could not properly
take judicial notice of the fact from a
brief, and it did not. However, the fact
would be sufficient to establish beyond
peradventure that the conditions in the
surviving parts of the Nebraska statute
could not be met by a permit to export.

B.

The facts of life on the Nebraska-Colorado
border: fragile detente.
Thompson v. Colorado Ground Water
Commission, 575 P.2d 372 (Colo. Sup. Ct.
1978). The view from Colorado:
The Colorado Ground Water Commission denied the application by one
Gordon L. Thompson to construct a well
and appropriate water from the Northern
High Plains Designated Ground Water
Basin in Yuma County, Colorado, less

than three miles from the Nebraska
line. The Commission found that no
water was available to appropriate.
If farther from the state line,
the Commission would have determined
the water available within a circle of
a three-mile radius from the proposed
well. Since 24 per cent of that circle
fell in Nebraska, the Commission
reduced the supply by 24 per cent. It
also rejected the contention that
extensive well-drilling and pumping in
Colorado would reverse the slope of the
water table into Nebraska, and intercept Nebraska water percolating from
Colorado.
The Colorado Court wrote:
"Expert testimony supported
the commission's position that
overappropriation of the aquifer
at the state line, with the intent
to stabilize or reverse the
aquifer flow to the benefit of
Colorado, would seriously injure
vested rights far west of the
state line and could ignite a
destructive aquifer depletion race
with Nebraska, an adjoining state.
Evidence that a portion of Colorado's ground water naturally
flows into adjoining states, when
considered in the context of the
commission's overall ground water
policy, does not establish a
breach of statutory duty by the
commission in its determination.
Id. at 377.
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C.

Would the missing facts -- which are not
judicially noticeable -- have made a
difference had they been in the record?
Clearly yes, if the Court had fully grasped
their significance. Although the naked
words of Nebraska and Colorado statutes can
be read like the patriotic snarls of
competing nuclear powers, it is apparent
that Nebraska and Colorado had achieved -pre-Sporhase -- a kind of detente or mutual
toleration based on a recognition of the
costs of uncontrolled pumping on either side
of the boundary.
1.

Is the Colorado-Nebraska detente
typical? Some evidence that it probably is, is that a number of western
States appeared as amici curiae to ask
for affirmance of the Nebraska Supreme
Court's decision. Only the City of El
Paso, supporting its commerce clause
claim to Texas groundwater, asked for
reversal.

2.

If the Colorado-Nebraska situation is
not typical, it should be. The lesson
learned from a century and a half of
experience since Acton v. Blundell in
1843 is clear. Users of a short supply
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of an economic good taken from a common
pool must, in mutual self-interest,
combine to carry out and enforce
against avaricious dissidents some
basis for rationing the resource.
Failure to do so is destructive of the
resource, and to nearly everyone's
self-interest accurately perceived.
Verification is found in the fact that
only in Texas does the rule of
"absolute ownership" prevail with
respect to percolating groundwater.
Even in Texas it is modified to forbid
a surface owner from pumping water when
it cannot be beneficially used.
3.

The foregoing is the most plausible
explanation of Altus v. Carr, 255 F.
Supp. 828, aff'd without opinion, 385
U.S. 35, the only prior Supreme Court
case which serves as even a partial
precedent for Sporhase. Indeed,
Friendswood Development Co. v. SmithSouthwest Industries, Inc., 576 S.W.2d
21 (Tex. 1978), attributed the result
in Altus V. Carr to Texas' attachment
to the now aberrational "absolute ownership" doctrine of underlying groundwater.
-20-

D.

An opinion which leaves unclear what the
result will be on the narrow facts of
Sporhase is not a good basis to predict what
the Court may have intended to say about
other cases -- or even about a case like
Sporhase if all relevant facts had been in
the record. However, a broad reading of
Sporhase, federalizing the law of groundwater rights, is possible.

VI. The Broadest Reading of Sporhase: A Recipe for
Total Disaster.
A.

"The [Nebraska] reciprocity requirement does
not survive the 'strictest scrutiny'
reserved for facially discriminatory legis(102 Sup. Ct. at 3465.) An

lation."

absolute embargo on export of a state's
groundwater is subject to even greater
scrutiny. Rarely, therefore, if ever, will
any state be able to sustain the burden of
justifying a statute which treats out-ofstate consumption of its groundwater as
different from in-state consumption.
B.

The foregoing is a statement of what may be
called Sporhase doctrine at broadest. If
applied generally, it is a prescription for
disaster.
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1.

Effective conservation and preservation
of groundwater require not only substantive rules which are the basis for
allocation of the scarce resource, but
public administration and management of
the resource to prevent waste and
destruction.

2.

For most purposes, a state's power to
administer either people or natural
resources stop at the state's boundaries. (But cf. Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69 (1941); Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410 (1979).) This makes it
impossible for two states sharing a
single resource to conserve or to
preserve it except by agreement.
a. Suppose that States A and B overly
a small aquifer with approximately

_
100 wells in each state. State A's
laws are more permissive toward
pumpers than those of State B in
the matter of one or more of the
following:
(i) efficiency required to
qualify as a "beneficial use";
(ii) limitations on pumping
designed to prevent exhaustion of
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r

water supply:
(iii) permissible degradation
of groundwater quality from
reduction of water table, or
disposition of return flow from
groundwater or surface water;
(iv) groundwater recharge
programs; or
(v) restrictions of use to
preserve favored use categories -e.g., domestic use in preference
to mining use.
The enumeration can be extended

r

almost ad infinitum.
b.

None of the current formal
mechanisms is adequate to achieve
the best administration of the
interstate resource:
(1) Judicial apportionment in
the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is inconceivable
in the light of the vast number of
aquifers in the nation each of
which requires individualized
attention.

r

(2) An interstate compact is
too cumbersome in the light of the
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usual formalities required: (1)
an act of Congress consenting to
negotiation; (2) an act of each
state's legislature consenting to
negotiation; (3) negotiation of
compact by appointees of states
and of United States on compact
commission; (4) act of legislature
of each state concerned agreeing
to negotiated compact; (5) consent
of Congress. Finally, when
negotiated, nearly every compact
in history has proved too
inflexible to change, and harder
to amend than the United States
Constitution.
(3) For the same reasons, a
"congressional apportionment" by
Congress or authorized by Congress
is practically impossible.
c.

Happily the spirit of cooperation
which produced the Mayflower Compact, the Articles of Confederation, and the United States
Constitution is not dead. It
produced the wholly informal
apportionment by detente along the
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te".

Nebraska-Colorado border, and will

probably do so wherever self
interest of water users in a
common resource is accurately and
generally perceived. Water law
in the United States, be it
remembered was produced in the
West out of laws, customs, and
usage. Water law still depends
on that creative force.
C.

Sporhase, however, could easily destabilize
the very mechanisms necessary to promote

r

interstate cooperation and understanding.
1.

If agreement, formal or informal, or
overriding congressional legislation is
impossible, each state which is a party
to a dispute with one or more hostile
states has only one defense: unlimited
pumping to insure that each recovers
its share of the resource before it is
too late.

2.

Pre-Sporhase, that could lead to
reciprocal legislation, informal agreements, or judicial settlements of
arrangements worked out between State

r

Engineers. See Albion-Idaho Land Co.

v. Naf Irriq. Co., 97 F.2d 439 (10th
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Cir. 1938) for an interstate agreement
which in form is a judicial decree
apportioning waters of Clear Creek
between Idaho and Utah.
3.

Post-Sporhase, a broad reading of the
decision destroys incentives to negotiate interstate agreements, or to
achieve the results of an agreement by
reciprocal legislation. The relationship of adjudication to compacts was
recognized in the first interstate suit
over water rights in history, where the
Court quoted this famous passage from
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838):
"Bound hand and foot by the
prohibitions of the Constitution,
a complaining state can neither
treat, agree, nor fight with its
adversary, without the consent of
Congress. A resort to the judicial power is the only means left
for legally adjusting or persuading a state which has possession
of disputed territory to enter
into an agreement or compact
relating to a controverted
boundary. Few, if any, will be
made when it is left to the
pleasure of the state in possession; but when it is known that
tribunal can decide on the right,
it is most probable that controversies will be settled by compact." (Kansas v. Colorado, 185
U.S. 125, 144 (1902).)
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4.

If a state, or its water users, can
ignore the laws of a neighboring state
and appropriate water under the commerce clause there will be no incentive
either to adopt conservative measures,
or to reach interstate agreements. The
race to the pumphouse will be the only
defense remaining. Illustration is
found in El Paso's suit against S.E.
Reynolds, State Engineer of New Mexico,
where El Paso successfully attacked -invoking Sporhase -- the constitutionality of New Mexico's statute barring
export of groundwater. The New Mexico
statute, by making an exception for
water in tank trucks, was peculiarly
vulnerable since it made no attempt to
differentiate water reduced to possession and a water right. However, New
Mexico's right to conserve and preserve
water is probably not affected by the
statute. Although the water El Paso
seeks to appropriate from New Mexico
would be pumped from two interstate
aquifers underlying New Mexico, Texas,
and Mexico, the water El Paso seeks is
in quantities reachable only in New

-27-
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Mexico, and inaccessible to any point
in Texas. If successful, El Paso would
demand a permit from New Mexico,
accepting formal conditions as if El
Paso were in New Mexico. But El Paso
is not in New Mexico, thereby creating
a list of presently insoluble questions
of which the following are illustrations.
a.

Can El Paso, a creature of Texas
law which knows no right of appropriation of percolating groundwater, "appropriate" water under
New Mexico and receive thereby a
protection which Texas law would
refuse?

b.

After an El Paso "appropriation"
of groundwater can New Mexico
still change its groundwater law
as it has done with almost every
legislative session since adopted
in 1927, or would El Paso's
"appropriative" right be frozen
against change, however necessitous?

c.

Can the State Engineer of New
Mexico enforce conservation
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measures to insure beneficial use
of water in an out-of-state
location of use?
d.

Can El Paso's hoped-for "appropriative right" be reallocated
through eminent domain as can
water rights for use in Texas and
New Mexico?

e.

Can the Legislature of either
state take steps to regulate
prices for water service paid by
municipal users which include El
Paso's hoped-for "right" in New
Mexico?

f.

Will New Mexico be entitled to
reimbursement of its taxpayers for
costs of safeguarding and administering the sources of water in
New Mexico used in Texas? If so,
from whom?

g.

How can Texas and New Mexico
effectively reach agreement, if
the subject matter of the agreement has been allocated by a
federal district court decision.

h.

Are there limitations as a result
of an "El Paso" appropriation on
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the power of the people of Texas
to alter, amend, or revoke El
Paso's organic law, its boundaries, or its existence as a
municipal corporation?

VII. Prognosis.
A.

Happily, it lies within Congress' power to
restore the status quo ante Sporhase. But
while it remains uncertain whether Sporhase
changed anything along the Nebraska-Colorado
border, an effort to persuade Congress is
premature.
1.

The status quo ante Sporhase, with
respect to methods to allocate, administer, and manage interstate groundwater was far from clear or ideal.

2.

The 98th Congress, like the 97th
Congress, has been dithering about
legislation to facilitate interstate
coal slurry pipelines. (See H.R. 1010
and S. 267, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.)
While both Senate and House Committees
have evidenced willingness to say
almost anything to reassure those
worried by Sporhase that "State water
law" shall be respected, enforced, and
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enthroned, it has been difficult to
persuade the sponsors that "state water
law" and interstate coal slurry
pipelines are truly incompatible.
3.

Incompatibility is illustrated by South
Dakota's "sale" of Missouri River
System water, described by South
Dakota's Governor Janklow enthusiastically in June 1982. Under existing law,
any unappropriated water diverted from
the Missouri River is a resource which
belongs to all upstream and all
downstream states who share it.
Downstream states have litigiously
objected. Coal slurry legislation
sponsors have proposed or accepted
amendments that say something like
"State water law and interstate
apportionments by compact or any other
means, too."

4.

The fact is that "State water law"
means the law of each of 50 states.
There is no assured way under federal
interstate common law of equitable
apportionment to make a present
allocation by South Dakota to a coal
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slurry pipe line subject to a future
compact or a future judicial apportionment. Conversely, there is no way
for South Dakota to make a present
allocation of water paramount to a
future compact or a future apportionment. It is probably fortunate that
this is true. All larger project
planning has suffered from overoptimism
in refusing to recognize the limited
nature of the water resource. Overoptimism has been the enemy of prudent
conservation.
B.

The coal slurry solution, I would urge, if
as proposed slurry pipelines are to be
authorized in the national interest by the
Secretary of the Interior, is to require the
Secretary to determine that unappropriated
water is available for the pipelines for
which the Secretary's approval means the
exercise of federal condemnation for acquisition of rights-of-way. That is a minimal
federal responsibility. No state can perform it in a federal system. Hinderlider v.
La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92 (1938). Indeed, the State Engineer of
"Th
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one state lacks authority to install a
stream gauge outside the state which
commissioned him.
C.

Until the Sporehase litigation is concluded
-- and we know its outcome in terms of
whether Nebraska can conserve groundwater
for use in Nebraska -- the course of wisdom
among the states is to remember that the
Nebraska statute, its reciprocity embargo
excised, is now expressly a survivor of
Supreme Court scrutiny. Success should
attend its invocation if the state shows
that the conditions imposed are and closely
related to the conservation and preservation of groundwater.
Precisely, what kind of evidence will
serve? Is it necessary, or is it possible,
to do more than to show that a groundwater
basin with a number of users is in jeopardy
if those pumping from the east side are
subject to regulations materially more
permissive than those on the west side? In
the fullness of time, the Court will surely
arrive at the correct answer to that
question. The danger is that the groundwater resources may be irreparably damaged
before the Court identifies the problem.
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See Tarlock, So Its [sic] Not Ours -- Why
Can't We Keep It? A First Look at Sporehase
v. Nebraska, 18 Land & Water L. Rev. 137
(1938), a somewhat more alarmed view of
Sporehase than one taken here.
D.

One other thing should be done. Coupled to
the Nebraska Sporehase statute, now repaired
by surgery, should be a standing offer in
terms like these:
"The State Engineer [the term State
Engineer is better than Director of
Water Resources, because the job should
require a licensed civil engineer
knowledgeable in hydrology] of this
State shall stand ready to enter into
negotiations with his counterpart in
any other state or states with access
to groundwater shared by this state and
such other state or states to reach
agreement to create an interstate
groundwater management district with
power
(a) to limit total groundwater
extractions to safe annual yield, as
the agreement may in each instance
define that concept,
(b) to determine equitable share
of water rights which the interstate
supply will probably make available to
each state,
(c) to provide regulations
enforceable in both states to preserve
the aquifer and its water content in
the best usable condition quality of
water:
(d) to provide for financing of
interstate conservation district by
(a) an ad valorem real estate
tax on land benefited in each state,
(b) extraction tax on pumped
water, or
(c) water rate charges
applicable to water served by the
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the district." U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Common, 434 U.S. 452
(1978) opens the way to more informal
compacts, holding that some compacts at
least are effective without Congress
consent, subject however to Congress'
disapproval.
1.

That is a bold and innovative step. It
should be limited, in the first
instance, to an effective period of say
5 years before renegotiation.
Renegotiation should be permitted for
progressively longer periods, but
avoiding carefully and zealously the
rigidity of most interstate compacts
which Professor John A. Carver, Jr.,
described from this platform in 1982.

2.

Is the proposal too innovative? I
think not. In fact, it is needed to
deal with groundwater even if
Sporehase, El Paso, and new water
demands for slurrying coal had never
been heard of.

3.

What would be the benefits? Successful
interstate groundwater conservation
districts, freed temporarily from the
necessity of seeking permanent
legislation at a state capital, might
well become models for groundwater
management. I have not included any
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description of the political management
of such a district, but a cafeteria of
models is possible. A few illustrations should be incorporated in the
statute. A municipal corporation,
rather than a private corporation, is
the model I have in mind. Use of water
was a recognized public use, even when
the Court almost invariably spoke in
tones of deepest economic conservatism.
Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164
U.S. 112 (1896) (opinion upholding
California Wright Irrigation District
Act of 1887 by Rufus Peckham, author of
Court's opinion in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). Only
Fuller, C.J., and Field dissented in
Fallbrook without opinion).
Finally, such entities should be
permitted to join as parties with their
states. They will have the experience
to persuade the courts and the legislatures what works, and why.
For an excellent survey of
Interstate Cooperation and recent
literature, see Mary Ellen Harris,
Interstate Cooperation in Water

-36-

Resources Management, (Institute of
Urban and Regional Research, University
of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 1983).
D.

The limits of constitutional doctrine.
The development of the laws of water
and water rights in the United States offers
a compelling demonstration that concepts
like "ownership," "title," "public rights"
and "private rights" are necessarily
subordinate to limitations built into the
law of the physical universe -- like that
which causes water to flow to a lower level.
There is one such limitation which is built
into the structure of federalism in the
United States. I repeat it here because it
will ultimately compel the parts of the
governmental structure each to limit its
function to what it can achieve.
"The Congress shall have power . . . to
regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes."
Not one of the cases discussed involves
the limits of that power of Congress,
although there are limits. The issues of
water rights in Sporehase and in El Paso
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relate solely to what states are forbidden
to do because of the existence of that
clause. All such issues are for the Supreme
Court to decide in the first instance. The
danger, however, is that the Court in
deciding what that clause forbids -- purely
by negative inference -- will forget or
overlook three facts:
1.

A Supreme Court decision disabling or
appearing to disable or suspend state
law does not of itself create a federal
substitute for the law destroyed.

2.

Without the affirmative legislative
power of Congress, the Supreme Court
does not have power to appropriate
money, to tax, or to administer laws.

3.

Water resources require not only
administration and management to meet
ongoing experience, but a responsiveness to unforeseen and unforseeable
local conditions. The national
legislature cannot adequately respond
to the exigent water needs in 50
separate states, many of which vary
within a state as a sharply as needs in
one state differ from those of another.
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The power of the Supreme Court, however, is even more limited, because the
Court lacks both the power of purse and
sword. The Court's power under the
commerce clause where Congress has not
legislated is a power limited to saying
no.
Administration and management of
fragile water resources demands a
lawmaking power which can also say yes
-- without delay. Water law must adapt
to perceived local necessity. Federal
power is important, because the
resources are federal in dimension.
But the forces that shape the law
interstate water rights must come from
the initiatives of those within the
states and must be built upon custom
and experience. It is now a legislative function -- state and federal -to nurture the mechanisms to create
flexible interstate law to administer
the most fragile of interstate natural
resources.
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